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Summary  
Credibility assessment of testimony is a very important part in the asylum 
adjudication procedure. The credibility assessment is intended to tell 
decision-makers whether they should accept the facts as supported by the 
applicant’s statement. Only those parts of the statement which are recognized 
as credible will then be considered in determining the validity of the asylum 
claim.  
This thesis examines the legal standards: consistency and coherence, 
sufficiency of detail and specificity, plausibility, and demeanour. It also 
examines the relevant psychological research and analyses whether or not 
these two disciplines are compatible. The general finding is that, largely, the 
credibility indicators that are used in the asylum procedure are based on 
assumptions about human memory, behaviour, attitudes, values etc. that have 
little or no certain basis in scientific research.  Psychological research also 
shows that very much is subjective and differs from individual to individual. 
There are also other factors regarding the credibility assessment which can 
question the accuracy and adequacy of the procedure: There are no 
instructions on how to weigh the individual indicators and no explanation of 
their inter-relationship. As a result, decision-makers can pick and choose from 
the different criteria as they see fit and in addition, these indicators are not 
clearly defined which can lead to different subjective interpretations, resulting 
in an arbitrary procedure.  
Lastly, this thesis recommends measures that need to be taken in order to 
improve the accuracy and legal certainty of credibility assessment of 
testimony, both in the long-term aspect within the framework of the European 
Union, as well as within the more immediate context which is possible within 
the domestic sphere.  
 
Keywords: credibility assessment, veracity of testimony, asylum procedure, 
CEAS, Swedish asylum procedure  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
People fleeing persecution, war, risk of torture or the death penalty can claim 
international protection/asylum in the European Union (EU).1 But how do 
you know whether someone is telling the truth, and is actually fleeing because 
of that and not because of mere economical or other reasons? Linguistically, 
the conventional meaning of credibility is whether a person is capable of 
being believed, or whether he/she is reliable or trustworthy.2 The term 
credibility assessment refers to the procedure of firstly gathering the relevant 
information from the applicant; secondly, examining it in light of all the other 
available material; and thirdly determining whether the statements of the 
applicant that concerns the relevant features of the asylum claim can be 
approved, for the purpose of the determination of qualification for protection 
status.3  
Accordingly, credibility assessment of testimony plays an important role in 
the adjudication of asylum applications. The first step in deciding on a claim 
for international protection requires the decision-maker to establish the 
material facts in the case, and this credibility assessment is an essential part 
of this process. The decision-maker must determine whether and which parts 
of the applicant’s accounts relating to the material elements of the claim can 
be accepted as a truthful fact. Only those parts of the statement which are 
recognized as credible will then be considered in determining whether those 
facts are enough to generate a valid asylum claim.4  That is to say, whether 
                                                          
1 Council Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L. 337/9; see also section 2.1, below. 
2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Beyond Proof, Credibility Assessment 
in EU Asylum Systems: Full Report’ (May 
2013) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/519b1fb54.html> accessed 24 May 2015 (Beyond 
Proof) p. 27. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Madeline Garlick, ‘Selected aspects of UNHCR’s research findings and analysis in the 
‘Beyond Proof’ report’, in Carolus Grütters, Elspeth Guild & Sebastiaan de Groot, 
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the asylum-seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution in terms of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)5,6 or if 
he/she faces a real risk of suffering serious harm7 if returned. The credibility 
assessment thus assist in answering the decision-makers’ question of how to 
know whether they should accept the facts as supported by the applicant’s 
statement.8  
In some cases, this assessment of the veracity of applicants’ statements may 
be a straightforward process, but in others it is a significant and challenging 
part of the procedure. Decision-makers have admitted to spend the majority 
of their working time on credibility assessments and they have also 
acknowledged that it is the most challenging aspect of their work.9 Credibility 
is as such, to some extent, nearly always at issue. Actually, numeral studies 
in the EU and other regions indicate that a large proportion of decisions to 
deny asylum claims are based wholly or partially on negative credibility 
findings.10  
However, what sets the asylum procedure apart is that this negative credibility 
finding must be a correct one because of the potentially deadly consequences 
of a wrongful decision. Nonetheless, there are examples that indicate that a 
substantial number of asylum claims that are overturned on appeal find that 
                                                          
Assessment of Credibility by Judges in Asylum Cases in the EU (Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2013)  p. 51.   
5 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 
22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention). 
6 See more in section 2.1, below. 
7 See more in section 2.1, below. 
8 Beyond Proof, (n2) p. 27.  
9 Audry Macklin, ‘Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the Refugee 
Context’, International Association of Refugee Law Judges 1998 Conference (2003). 
10 See e.g. Michael Kagan, ‘Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility 
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination’ (2002) 17 Geo Immigr LJ 367 (Is Truth in 
the Eye of the Beholder) p. 369; Liv Feijen & Emelia Frennmark, Kvalitet i svensk 
asylprövning: en studie av Migrationsverkets utredning av och beslut om internationellt 
skydd (UNHCR, Stockholm 2011) (Kvalitet i svensk asylprövning) p. 192; Rosemary Byrne 
‘Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings: Guiding Standards from the 
International Criminal Tribunals’ (2007) 19 Intl J Ref L 609, pp. 609–638; Gregor Noll 
(ed), Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005); Robert Thomas, ‘Assessing the Credibility of Asylum Claims: 
EU and UK Approaches Examined’ (2006) 8 Eur J Migr & L 79, p. 79. 
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the initial credibility assessment was flawed.11 This, alongside with the fact 
that the rate of overturns on appeal of initial decisions to refuse asylum can 
be as high as 25 percent,12 clearly illustrates the level of concern that should 
be devoted to the risk of erroneous credibility assessments.  
Having presented the problems and its introductory terminology, as well as 
the importance of the adjudication at hand, the author would like to submit 
the personal interest that gave rise to the thesis:  
While previously working as an asylum case officer at the Swedish Migration 
Board, I developed a general interest in credibility assessments in asylum 
claims. We, as case officers – who wrote proposals for the decisions to the 
decision-makers – spent a lot of time on this important task and I got to 
experience the practical hardships that comes with it as well as the limited 
existing guidance. Being aware of the dreadful consequences of a flawed 
decision, it was frustrating to say the least. A year before my work at the 
Migration Board, I had completed a course in witness psychology and my 
brief encounters with both of these fields were enough to question the 
methods used. It was this combination of knowledge and experience that 
inspired my research questions for this thesis.  
1.2 Aim of the Study  
The purpose of this thesis can be formulated into the following three research 
questions:   
 What are the legal standards relating to credibility assessments of 
testimony in asylum procedures?  
 
 Does the use of these standards have scientific support in the field of 
psychology?   
 
 If not, what measures should be taken in order to improve the accuracy 
and legal certainty of credibility assessments of testimony? 
                                                          
11 Amnesty International, ‘A question of credibility: Why so many initial asylum decisions 
are overturned on appeal in the UK’ (April 2013) 
<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/resources/question-credibility-why-so-many-initial-asylum-
decisions-are-overturned#.VWIG_JWIrIU> accessed 25 May 2015, p. 12. 
12 Ibid. p. 4. 
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1.3 Method and Material  
In order to answer the firs research question, it is firstly necessary to examine 
the existing law de lege lata; what legal standards exist within the sphere of 
credibility assessments of testimony in the asylum procedure? Since the thesis 
is focused on the legal standards within the EU,13 the legal sources that have 
been used have been selected based on those sources of law that are 
distinguishing the EU’s acquis as a legal system of its own kind, sui generis.14 
As such the following legally binding sources have been used: primary law 
(meaning the foundational treaties and the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights),15 binding secondary law (such as directives), case law from the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU), international agreements, general principles of 
law and case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).16 The 
thesis also refers to case law from national jurisdictions because of its 
relevance as potentially emerging general principles of law.17 Non-binding 
legal sources that works as a guidance for the hard EU-law18 have also been 
used such as soft law documents and scholarly work. 
This thesis also includes a case study of Sweden’s legal practice relating to 
credibility assessment of testimony in the asylum procedure.19 In this part the 
sources chosen have been based on the relevant Swedish legal sources, 
namely the case law from the Migration Court of Appeal, as well as the 
Migration Board’s Judicial Position.20  The purpose of the case study and the 
presentation of case law in particular is not supposed to be comprehensive in 
                                                          
13 See more in section 1.4, below.  
14 Jörgen Hettne, Ida Otken Eriksson (red.), EU-rättslig metod (Norstedts Juridik, 2005) pp.  
24-29, 44.  
15 Treaty on European Union; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
16 ECtHR case law is regarded as general principles of law under the EU acquis, see EU-
rättslig metod (n 14) pp. 64-65. 
17 Ibid. pp. 43-48. 
18  Ulf Bernitz & Anders Kjellgren, Europarättens grunder (Norstedts Juridik, 2010) p. 34.  
19 See more in section 1.4, below.  
20 See more in section 4.1, below.  
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any way, but is rather intended to shed light on the field through examples. 
I’ve chosen the cases – from a rather small amount of existing enlightening 
judgments in this area – that touch upon some of the issues explained in 
chapter 3, although in a very limited way, since the reasonings of the 
migration courts in Sweden tend to be extremely brief.   
For answering the second research question, it is necessary to conduct an 
interdisciplinary analysis, comparing the legal standards to psychological 
research, since the aim of the thesis is related to the effectiveness of the law 
in external consistency terms – evaluating the difference between the “legal 
reality and the real reality”, meaning not the reality of whether the claimed 
events took place or not, but the reality of the human mind and behaviour – 
psychology.21 The selection of psychological research has been primarily 
based on often-cited, peer-reviewed articles published in various prominent 
journals. If not contradicted by such well renowned sources, secondary 
material (e.g. national training modules/guidelines or such material from the 
UNHCR) has also been consulted in the process. It also has to be stated that 
the relevant research often consists of individual studies and they often point 
out that more research in the area is needed in order to be able to draw any 
general conclusions. Furthermore, a majority of the studies have been 
conducted within the area of criminal law, which is good to have in mind. 
These studies are however still relevant since they are concerning – just as in 
the asylum procedure – retelling of special events, and often such events 
which are emotionally challenging to recount. The question that the 
adjudicators have to ask themselves are the same in both types of procedures: 
Is the testimony believable or not? 
The third question will be answered in a de lege ferenda perspective, and the 
thesis will discuss brief aspects of remedies that should be taken in order to 
improve the accuracy and legal certainty of credibility assessments of 
testimony.  
                                                          
21 See Wendy Schrama, ‘How to carry out interdisciplinary legal research: Some 
experiences with an interdisciplinary research method’ (2011) 7 Utrecht L Rev 147.  
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1.4 Scope, Definitions, Limitations and Assumptions  
To begin with – and it might already be clarified – this thesis will only cover 
the credibility assessment of the applicant’s own testimony, and not any other 
evidence, such as any documentary evidence that the applicant may be able 
to present. It will therefore not discuss the credibility assessment of, for 
example, medical reports. 
As already mentioned, this essay will focus on the European legal standards, 
more particularly, the legal standards within the sphere of the EU. I have 
chosen to delimit the paper to the EU mainly because of the limitation of time 
and resources given to conduct this thesis but also since the asylum law differs 
immensely from state to state and from region to region; thus another reason 
for choosing the sphere of the EU is because of its ambition of creating a 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS).22  
The case study of Sweden has been chosen not only because of personal 
interest, but also because it is highly relevant – according to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) it is undeniable that in 
a global as well as in a European perspective, Sweden’s asylum procedure 
holds a high standard. This has been affirmed by the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees António Guterres who has stated that Sweden has one of the 
most stabile asylum systems in the world. Sweden has for many years been a 
pioneer country as regards the interpretation of international refugee law and 
has a recognized legal certainty in its asylum procedures.23 As such the case 
study is intended to serve as an example of “best practice”. Another reason 
why Sweden is relevant for a case study in this field is because of the 
numbers: of the industrialized countries around the globe, Sweden is fourth 
                                                          
22  See more, European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Common European 
Asylum System’ <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm> accessed 25 January 2015. 
23 Swedish Migration Board, Refusal Letter, cited in Kvalitet i svensk asylprövning (n 10) p. 
6. 
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in the world in receiving asylum applications, receiving 75,100 in 2014; and 
when measured per capita, Sweden tops the list.24  
As to the term credibility, besides the short explanation above, there is need 
for some further legal clarification. It has been found that the term is often 
used indiscriminately in two different contexts. While this may be correct in 
lay terms, it has been argued that it is not in legal terms25 and the author of 
this thesis agrees with the argument. Consequently, the context that is legally 
correct relates to “the credibility of a claimant’s evidence, presented as their 
past and present factual background”,26 (emphasis added) and it is within this 
setting that the thesis has been written. In the other way, which is as argued 
wrong in law – and therefore not within the sphere of the thesis – the term 
credibility is often roughly used to cover the “credibility of everything related 
to the claim for recognition as a refugee or protected person”.27 (emphasis 
added) In this setting, the term is used as meaning all the evidence that is 
relevant to the claim, e.g. does the person have a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for a convention reason if returned; or if the facts are not enough 
for granting of refugee status, are there substantial grounds for believing that 
the applicant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm upon return?28  
1.5 Disposition  
Chapter two will give the unfamiliar reader an overview of what is necessary 
to know about the asylum procedure before digging into the area of credibility 
assessment of testimony. Chapter 3 will examine the four credibility 
indicators from a legal and psychological perspective. Chapter 4 consists of a 
case study and will present and analyse Sweden’s soft law as well as examples 
                                                          
24 UNHCR, ‘Asylum Trends 2014: Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries’ (26 
March 2015) <http://www.unhcr.org/551128679.html> accessed 25 May 2015, p. 20.  
25 Allan Mackey, ‘Introduction to the Credo Project’, in Assessment of Credibility by 
Judges in Asylum Cases in the EU (n 4) p. 69.  
26 Ibid.  
27 John Barnes & Allan Mackey, ‘The Credo Document: Assessment of Credibility in 
Refugee and Subsidiary Protection Claims under the EU Qualification Directive: Judicial 
Criteria and Standards’, in Assessment of Credibility by Judges in Asylum Cases in the EU 
(n 4) p. 100.  
28 See more at section 2.1, below.  
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of relevant case law. Chapter 5 will sum up the main findings of the study, 
provide some further analytical discussion as well as a brief presentation of 
the author’s suggestions on how to improve the credibility assessment 
procedure.   
9 
 
 
2. The Asylum Procedure    
2.1 The Special Character of the Asylum Procedure  
In 2004, the EU adopted a directive setting out rules governing minimum 
standards on conditions under which refugee status and subsidiary protection 
status is granted as part of the CEAS,29 followed by a recast in 2011.30 The 
refugee status is based on the member states’ obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and the subsidiary protection status is based on their obligations 
under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).  
An applicant can be granted refugee status if he/she has a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion 
or membership of a particular social group.31 An applicant can attain 
subsidiary protection status if there are substantial grounds for believing there 
would be a real risk of ‘serious harm’ if he/she would be returned.32 Such 
serious harm includes death penalty/execution, torture/inhuman/degrading 
treatment or punishment, or a serious threat to life or person due to 
indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict.33 The Directive also 
obliges member states to “respect the principle of non-refoulement in 
accordance with their international obligations.”34 This obligation also 
emanate from the Refugee Convention35 and the case law of the ECtHR,36 
                                                          
29 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted [2004] OJ L. 304/12. 
30 Council Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of 
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L. 337/9 (Qualification Directive). 
31 Ibid. article 2(d). 
32 Ibid. article 2(f). 
33 Ibid. article 15. 
34 Ibid. article 21. 
35 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 
22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) article 33. 
36 Jacobs, White & Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, (5th edn Oxford 
University Press, 2010) pp. 144, 179-182.  
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forbidding states to expel or return (‘refouler’) persons in need of 
international protection.  
The asylum procedure is clearly different from almost all other areas of the 
domestic law of the EU’s member states, which its lawyers and judges in their 
respective jurisdictions are familiar with. Today, this field of law is rather 
extensive and specialized but it is still a young branch of law, having only 
developed in the last 25 years. As a result, formal training in the field of 
lawyers and judges is often either poor or completely absent, leading them to 
rely on principles of domestic administrative law. Evidently, what is quite 
unique is that within the asylum procedure one party is an individual who is 
a non-national and the other is a state, and significance is put on the future 
(risk assessment) instead of the past. Also, the factual substance of the claims 
will be very hard to check and thus reference to the country information in 
other states is needed and in many cases, the testimony of the applicant is the 
only source.37 
Another striking feature is that the Refugee Convention and the ECHR, are 
so called ‘living instruments’, like many other related human rights treaties, 
and should be interpreted in light of social and political development together 
with a liberal interpretation of rights contra a narrow interpretation of 
restrictions. This means that the application of the instruments is constantly 
evolving and changing over time to meet the new needs and circumstances of 
today’s reality.38  
The asylum procedure is also set apart from other domestic immigration 
procedures. The asylum decisions are made in the field of ‘rights-based’ law 
and not the domestic ‘privilege-based’ immigration law. Each state is entitled 
to police its own borders and thereby domestically decide whether or not to 
                                                          
37 John Barnes & Allan Mackey, ‘The Credo Document: Assessment of Credibility in 
Refugee and Subsidiary Protection Claims under the EU Qualification Directive: Judicial 
Criteria and Standards’ (The Credo Document) in Assessment of Credibility by Judges in 
Asylum Cases in the EU (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2013) (Assessment of Credibility in the 
EU) p. 102. 
38 Ibid. p. 103. 
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grant the privilege to non-nationals to enter and remain in that state. Asylum 
decisions on the other hand, are derived from the international treaty 
obligations of the host state which are reinforced by the requirements of the 
CEAS.39 Furthermore, when an asylum-applicant enters a member state, they 
must be treated as potential refugees, as set out in the Refugee Convention, 
and thereby they are possessing certain rights on arrival. This is so because 
refugee and subsidiary protection statuses are declaratory, and not 
constitutive.40 By contrast, domestic immigration law decisions are made in 
a constitutive manner.41 
Another particularity with the asylum procedure is that its judicial 
independence and impartiality is at risk of being put under pressure from anti-
refugee/migrant pressure or other social pressures. This has been illustratively 
articulated by Sir Stephen Sedley: 
“Asylum law, however, has an aspect which I think makes it unique: the 
need for it to deal in outcomes which are publicly perceived as having a 
direct and often unwelcome effect on the lives of the settled population. 
Asylum judges consequently handle facts and topics which, unlike those 
addressed by any other branch of the law except crime, are a matter of often 
vitriolic daily public debate. You can attend fifty social gatherings, you can 
drink in a hundred bars, where the conversation never comes remotely near 
the problems of eviction or bankruptcy; but it’s unusual to be in any 
gathering where immigration does not sooner or later come up, and with it 
the view that asylum is a tolerated gateway for illegal economic migrants. 
… What affects judges in such a situation is not a targeted critique of their 
own role but an ambient pressure to put a finger in the dyke, to stem the 
tide, to stop the rot; to reject the stories they hear from asylum-seekers so 
that they can be sent home. At times this becomes nationality- or ethnicity-
specific. … It does not mean that adjudicators will all lurch in the same 
direction. There is just as much risk that conscientious judges will 
overcompensate for the pressures they sense around them. But the hothouse 
itself is, I think, peculiar to asylum law adjudication.”42 
                                                          
39 Ibid. at p. 104. 
40 UNHCR, ‘Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees’ (December 2011) (Handbook) <http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html> 
accessed 25 May 2015, para 28. 
41 The Credo Document (n 37) p. 104. 
42 Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘Asylum: Can the Judiciary Maintain its Independence?’ 
(International Association of Refugee Law Judges World Conference, April 2002) 
12 
 
 
Also, in the asylum procedure – and arguably more so than in other areas of 
the law – many applicants will have vulnerabilities inherent in their situation, 
thus the judge must take into consideration psychological and trauma 
dimensions affecting them.43 All judges must recognize – particularly as part 
of credibility assessments – that not only are some applicants better in 
articulating their story and background than others, but also that a 
psychological impairment – often as a result of past persecution or serious 
maltreatment – will often affect the presentation and evidence of genuine 
applicants.44  
Normally, lawyers, judges and government officials in most domestic case 
law situations are inclined to request for corroborative documentation of a 
certain claim.45 By contrast, those genuinely in flight from the risk of being 
persecuted or severely maltreated, and often directly so by the state, may not 
be able to access their personal documentation such as passports, medical 
reports etc. that would be expected as corroboration in the immigration 
context.46  
Lastly, another difference worth mentioning is that by its very nature, asylum 
procedures will usually involve both cross-cultural and language 
interpretation and translation. This in turn extends to a need to understand 
subtle cultural, demeanour, gender and linguistic matters. While such issues 
can arise in other areas of domestic law litigation, they are certainly more the 
exception than the norm.47 
 
 
                                                          
<http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/Credo/S_Sedley_article_IARLJ_publication_2
002.pdf> accessed 2015-04-21, p. 3.  
43 See more in section 3, below. 
44 The Credo Document (n 37) p. 107. 
45 Ibid. p. 108. 
46 See Qualification Directive (n 30) article 4(5); Handbook (n 40) para 196. 
47 The Credo Document (n 37) p. 109.  
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2.2 Four Evidentiary Principles   
There are four basic evidentiary principles that are necessary to have in mind 
in order to understand the reasons behind the procedure of credibility 
assessment in asylum adjudication. Firstly, the burden of proof lies 
principally on the applicant, but is at the same time shared with the state. 
Secondly, this does not mean that the applicant has to ‘prove’ his/her case but 
rather to substantiate his/her application. Thirdly, in some situations, the 
applicant is granted the ‘benefit of the doubt’, and fourthly, unless the 
applicant has been provided a chance to comment on adverse evidence, that 
piece of evidence cannot be used against him/her. These principles are 
established in Article 4 of the Qualification Directive and in member state’s 
case law and will be explained below: 
While Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive gives Member States the 
option48 to “consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible 
all elements needed to substantiate the application”,49 (emphasis added) it 
also states that it is the duty of the Member state in cooperation with the 
applicant to assess the relevant elements of the application.50 The CJEU has 
explained this shared duty as follows: 
“This requirement that the Member State cooperate therefore means, in 
practical terms, that if, for any reason whatsoever, the elements provided by 
an applicant for international protection are not complete, up to date or 
relevant, it is necessary for the Member State concerned to cooperate 
                                                          
48 The Qualification Directive provides minimum standards, thus any other standard 
adopted by Member States must be of a ‘more favourable’ nature. For full discussion See 
the section called ‘Residual doubts and Article 4 QD’, in International Association of 
Refugee Law Judges, ‘Assessment of Credibility in Refugee and Subsidiary Protection 
claims under the EU Qualification Directive: Judicial Criteria and Standards’ (March 2013) 
(Residual doubts and Article 4 QD) 
<https://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/Credo/Credo_Paper_March2013-rev1.pdf> 
accessed 24 April 2015, pp. 48-50. 
49 Qualification Directive (n 30) article 4(1).  
50 Ibid. 
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actively with the applicant, at that stage of the procedure, so that all the 
elements needed to substantiate the application may be assembled.”51 
As a result of the inherent peculiarities of the asylum procedure, it is not 
required that the applicant can prove the asserted facts. Article 4 of the 
Qualification Directive does not use the term ‘proof’ or ‘prove’, rather it 
specifically refers to the duty to “substantiate the application”. The wording 
in Article 4(1), (2) and (3)52 suggest that this means, simply to provide 
statements and submit documentary or other evidence in support of an 
application.53 The ECtHR has acknowledged the hardships that applicants are 
faced with in relation to obtaining direct documentary evidence, and has 
stated that they should only be required to do so “to the greatest extent 
practically possible”.54 
                                                          
51 Case C-277/11, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland, Attorney 
General, [2012] ECR 1-0000, para. 66; See also R.C. v. Sweden (App no 41827/07) ECHR 
9 March 2010, para. 50; Handbook (n 40) paras 195-197. 
52 Wording as follows:  
“1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible 
all the elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection…  
2. The elements referred to in paragraph 1 consist of the applicant’s statements and all the 
documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the applicant’s age, background, 
including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of 
previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, travel documents and the 
reasons for applying for international protection.  
3. The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an 
individual basis and includes taking into account:  
(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision 
on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner 
in which they are applied;  
(b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including 
information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious 
harm;  
(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors 
such as background, gender and  
age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the 
acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or 
serious harm;  
(d) whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in 
for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for 
international protection, so as to assess whether those activities would expose the applicant 
to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country;  
(e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of another country where he or she could assert citizenship.” 
53 UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof, Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems: Full Report’ 
(May 2013) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/519b1fb54.html> accessed 24 May 2015 
(Beyond Proof) p. 85. 
54 Said v. The Netherlands (App no 2345/02) ECHR 2005-VI 275, para 49. 
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Article 4(5) of the Qualification Directive also contains a clause giving the 
applicant evidentiary relief, a principle called ‘benefit of doubt’,55 stated as 
follows:  
“… where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by 
documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation 
when the following conditions are met: 
(a) The applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application; 
(b) All relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, 
and a satisfactory explanation has been given regarding any lack of other 
relevant elements; 
(c) The applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and 
do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to 
the applicant’s case; 
(d) The applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest 
possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not 
having done so; and 
(e) The general credibility of the applicant has been established.” 
Another evidentiary principle that is beneficiary for the applicant is that of 
audi alteram partem or ‘equality of arms’. This means that ‘the other side’ 
must be heard and as such, that if the applicant has not had the opportunity to 
explain, refute or provide mitigating circumstances in respect of contradictory 
or confusing evidence that is material and could potentially undermine core 
elements of his/her claim, that piece of evidence should not be taken into 
account in the credibility assessment.56  
  
                                                          
55 See also, R.C. v. Sweden (n 51) para 50; N. v. Sweden (App no 23505/09) ECHR 20 July 
2010, para 53; F.H. v. Sweden (App no 32621/06) ECHR 20 January 2009, para. 95; 
Handbook (n 40) para 203-204. 
56 See Residual doubts and Article 4 QD (n. 48) p. 36, citing several Member State cases 
from Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic.  
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3. Credibility assessment: legal 
standards and psychological research  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Despite the EU’s aim of establishing a CEAS, a common understanding of, 
or approach to the credibility assessment is absent among Member States. 
Article 4 of the Qualification Directive together with some relevant 
provisions in the Asylum Procedures Directive57 provide very limited 
guidance, and apart from that, the EU asylum acquis is silent on this core 
aspect of the asylum procedure.58 
Even so, some judicial guidance can be drawn based on principles of EU 
administrative law, including the right to a fair and public hearing, 
proportionality, legal certainty, equality of arms and the right to effective 
remedy.59 These principles have together with already existing state practice 
in the asylum area formed the following basic criteria that are relevant to 
credibility assessment of testimony: Consistency and coherence, sufficiency 
of detail and specificity, plausibility, and demeanour. They will be described 
below, accompanied with relevant psychological research.60 
                                                          
57 Council Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L. 180/60 (Asylum Procedures 
Directive). 
58 Madeline Garlick, ‘Selected aspects of UNHCR’s research findings and analysis in the 
‘Beyond Proof’ report’, in Carolus Grütters, Elspeth Guild & Sebastiaan de Groot, 
Assessment of Credibility by Judges in Asylum Cases in the EU (Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2013) p. 51-52. 
59 These judicial principles can be found in the core instruments of the EU – both in 
primary legislation such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; and 
in secondary legislation consisting of regulations and directives relating to the 
implementation of the CEAS, in particular the already mentioned Council Directive 
2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L. 337/9 (Qualification Directive), the Asylum 
Procedures Directive (n 57), and the ECHR, as well as in case law from the domestic courts 
of EU Member States, see John Barnes & Allan Mackey, ‘The Credo Document: 
Assessment of Credibility in Refugee and Subsidiary Protection Claims under the EU 
Qualification Directive: Judicial Criteria and Standards’ (Credo Document) in Assessment 
of Credibility by Judges in Asylum Cases in the EU ibid. p. 126.    
60 See section 3.2-3.6, below.  
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From a psychological perspective, the indicators that are used to assess the 
credibility of the applicants’ statements, are based on several assumptions on 
how people function, including those about human memory, behaviour, 
attitudes, values, how a genuine account is presented and perceptions of and 
responses to risk.61 Undeniably, it is commonly assumed that human memory, 
perceptions and behaviour conform to a certain norm, and that an applicant 
who deviates from this norm may indicate that he/she lacks credibility. 
Conversely, psychological scientific research has shown that these 
assumptions that decision-makers and interviewers usually make may not be 
in harmony with what is now known about human memory, perceptions, and 
behaviour. The research actually indicates that there is no such norm, and that 
human memory, perceptions and behaviour come within a wide variety and 
unpredictability, and that these elements are affected by many different 
factors and circumstances.62  
In order to substantiate their application, applicants are required to recall 
relevant past (and present) facts to substantiate their application and to do so, 
they must rely on their memory. Therefore, it is important that decision-
makers have realistic expectations of what an applicant should be able to 
remember.63 Scientific research in the field of psychology reveals that the 
variability in a person’s ability to record, retain, and retrieve memories is 
wide-ranging.64 Many people struggle with recalling memories and facts of 
past events, and some people appear to simply be able to do this more easily 
than others. In addition, when it comes to memories of the most traumatic, 
important, or recent life events, psychological research has consistently 
                                                          
61 J Herlihy, K Gleeson, S Turner, ‘What Assumptions about Human Behaviour Underlie 
Asylum Judgments?’ (2010) 22 Intl J Ref L 351, p. 351. 
62  See generally J Cohen, ‘Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors 
of Recall in the Testimony of Asylum Seekers’ (2001) 13 Intl J Ref L 293, pp. 293-309 
(Questions of Credibility). 
63  See generally H Evans Cameron, ‘Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of 
Memory’ (2010) 22 Intl J Ref L 469, pp. 469–511. 
64  Questions of Credibility (n 62). 
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shown that such memories can be difficult to retrieve and recall with any 
accuracy.65 
It is more likely for asylum applicants to have experienced traumatic events 
than it is for the general population.66 Memories of traumatic experiences 
differ considerably from normal memories, 67 and the need to cope with these 
experiences also affects the memory.68 In addition, traumatic experiences also 
effects behaviour.69 People who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), show symptoms of sensory encoding of the events, conscious and 
unconscious avoidance of memories of the event, distressing re-experiences 
of the events, poor concentration, irritability and other hyper-arousal 
symptoms.70 These difficulties can also be experienced by applicants not 
satisfying the full range of criteria that are necessary to receive a psychiatric 
diagnosis as PTSD.71 
Persons who have experienced traumatic events may also experience 
dissociation.72 If dissociated at the time of when the traumatic event takes 
                                                          
65  C A Morgan-III, et al., ‘Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered 
during Exposure to Highly Intense Stress’(2004) 27 Intl J L & Psychiatry 265, pp. 265–
729; T Valentine, J Mesout, ‘Eyewitness Identification under Stress in the London 
Dungeon’ (2009) 23 Applied Cognitive Psychology 151, pp. 151–161. 
66 See e.g. S Dahl, A Mutapcic, B Schei, ‘Traumatic Events and Predictive Factors for 
Posttraumatic Symptoms in Displaced Bosnian Women in a War Zone’ (1998) 11 J 
Traumatic Stress 137, pp. 137−145; C Gorst-Unsworth, E Goldenberg, ‘Psychological 
Sequelae of Torture and Organised Violence Suffered by Refugees from Iraq. Trauma-
Related Factors Compared with Social Factors in Exile’ (1998) 172 British J Psychiatry, 
pp. 90−94; M Hollifield et al., ‘Measuring Trauma and Health Status in Refugees: A 
Critical Review’ (2002) 288 J Am Medical Ass, pp. 611–621. 
67 J Herlihy, S Turner, ‘The Psychology of Seeking Protection’ (2009) 21 Intl J Ref L, 171 
p. 176; J Herlihy, L Jobson, S Turner, ‘Just Tell Us What Happened to You: 
Autobiographical Memory and Seeking Asylum’ (2012) 26 Applied Cognitive Psychology 
661, pp. 661–676 (Just Tell Us What Happened to You). 
68 Questions of Credibility, (n 62) pp. 293–309; see also Australian Government, ‘Guidance 
on Vulnerable Persons’ (June 2012) <http://www.mrt-
rrt.gov.au/Files/HTML/GuidelineVulnerablePersonsMarch15JUL.html> accessed 25 May 
2015, paras 64 and 92. 
69 Just Tell Us What Happened to You, (n 67). 
70 American Psychiatric Association, ‘Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders’ (5th edn. APA, 2013) section II; see also Guidance on Vulnerable Persons (n 68) 
para. 79. 
71 J Herlihy, S Turner, ‘Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum Seekers be Taken as 
Proof of Deceit?’ (2006) Torture 81, p. 86. 
72  Dissociation is described as the “disruption in the usually integrated functions of 
consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment”: Diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders (n. 70); D Bögner, J Herlihy, C Brewin, ‘Impact of 
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place, it may hinder the person’s encoding of the event in memory. The 
applicant may then in turn experience something called dissociative amnesia, 
which is, simply put, an inability to remember some or all aspects of the 
happening, because the event itself, or aspects of it, was never encoded to 
begin with.73 
3.2 Consistency and coherence  
“It is considered inconsistent that in your screening interview you claimed 
that you surrendered at Vattuvakkal, then detained at Mullaitivu and then 
transferred to Omanathy, whereas in your asylum interview you claimed to 
have first surrendered at Mullaitivu. Your inability to remain consistent 
about where you were when you surrendered casts doubt on the veracity of 
your claim”74 
 
3.2.1 Legal standards 
Consistency and coherence as credibility indicators have been used 
synonymously. While consistency seems to be a more clear concept and 
coherence a more elusive one, they tend to mean the same thing in practice.75 
Internal consistency – or coherence – means that all of the applicant’s 
statements, including the statements presented by the applicant from their first 
meetings, applications, personal interviews and examination at all stages of 
processing, should be consistent within themselves and with each other. The 
applicant’s statements should also be consistent with all the other external 
objective evidence, including duly weighted Country of Origin Information 
(COI), expert evidence and any other relevant evidence.76 If discrepancies are 
                                                          
Sexual Violence on Disclosure during Home Office Interviews’ (2007) 191 British J 
Psychiatry, pp. 75–78. 
73 The Psychology of Seeking Protection (n 67) p. 178.  
74 United Kingdom Home Office Refusal Letter concerning an asylum seeker from Sri 
Lanka, cited in Amnesty International, ‘A question of credibility: Why so many initial 
asylum decisions are overturned on appeal in the UK’ (April 2013) 
<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/resources/question-credibility-why-so-many-initial-asylum-
decisions-are-overturned#.VWIG_JWIrIU> accessed 25 May 2015 (A Question of 
Credibility) p. 21. 
75 See UNHCR, ‘The Heart of the Matter - Assessing Credibility when Children Apply for 
Asylum in the EU’ (May 2014) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/55014f434.html> accessed 
25 May 2015 (Heart of the Matter) pp. 153-155. 
76 See Qualification Directive (n 59) article 4(5)(c); UNHCR, ‘Handbook and Guidelines on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
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identified (internally or externally), these findings should be clearly explained 
to the applicant and he/she must be given the chance to respond. The 
responses and explanations given by claimants when challenged on the 
apparent contradictions must be taken into account.77 Internal consistency is 
thus an indicator of credibility, and inconsistency is indicative of non-
credibility. On the other hand, decision-makers may also equate consistency 
with a rehearsed testimony.78   
Even though it has been recognized repeatedly – by international judicial and 
monitoring organs,79 as well as by national jurisprudence80 – that minor 
inconsistencies should not generally be seen to undermine the credibility of 
the asserted fact, there are still examples of cases from Member States of the 
EU where minor inconsistencies relating to precise figures have been used to 
                                                          
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (December 2011) (Handbook) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html> accessed 25 May 2015, paras 42, 197; UNHCR, 
‘Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims’ (December 1998) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3338.html> accessed 25 May 2015, para. 11; 
International Association of Refugee Law Judges, ‘Assessment of Credibility in Refugee 
and Subsidiary Protection claims under the EU Qualification Directive: Judicial criteria and 
standards’ (2013) 
<https://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/Credo/Credo_Paper_March2013-rev1.pdf> 
accessed 24 April 2015 (Assessment of Credibility: Judicial Criteria and Standards) pp. 
33-35. 
77 R.C. v. Sweden (App no 41827/07) ECHR 9 March 2010, para. 52; Said v. The 
Netherlands (App no 2345/02) ECHR 2005-VI 275, para. 51; M. v. Sweden (App no 
22556/05) ECHR 6 September 2007; UN Committee Against Torture, ‘General Comment 
No. 1’ (1997) UN Doc A/53/44, annex IX; United Kingdom Home Office, ‘Asylum Policy 
Instruction: Assessing credibility and refugee status’ (January 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397778/AS
SESSING_CREDIBILITY_AND_REFUGEE_STATUS_V9_0.pdf> accessed 25 May 
2015, sections 6.6.2-5.6.3; Assessment of Credibility: Judicial Criteria and Standards (n 
76) pp. 33-35, citing the following cases: United Kingdom, Y v. SHHD [2006] EWCA Civ 
1223]; Poland, Sacp File 11OSK 902/10 (20 April 2011); Croatia, Re. Miroshnikov (15 
June 2012) ACZ No Usl-1287/12; Norway, Case HR-201102133-A (16 November 2011) 
Norwegian Supreme Court, 2011/817; Netherlands: Malumba ABRvS (27 January 2003), 
No. 2002062971, JV 2003/103. 
78 UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof, Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems: Full Report’ 
(May 2013) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/519b1fb54.html> accessed 24 May 2015 
(Beyond Proof) p.164. 
79 See for example R.C. v. Sweden (n 77) para. 52; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Trial Judgment), ICTY-96-23-T and 96-
23/1-T (22 February 2001), para. 564. 
80 See Beyond Proof (n 78) p. 151 citing the following cases: A v. the head of the State 
Agency for Refugees, Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria (Върховен 
административен съд) (30 June 2008) 11774/2007; L. O. v. Ministry of Interior, Supreme 
Administrative Court of Czech Republic (Nejvyšší správní soud) (28 July 2009) 5 Azs 
40/2009-74.  
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reject the core aspects of an applicant’s account.81 It has also been observed 
that one of the most common inconsistencies cited as an indicator 
undermining credibility, related to temporal information such as frequency, 
dates and duration of events.82  
3.2.2 Psychological research 
The practice of using ‘consistency’ as an indicator is based on the assumption 
that liars are more likely to be inconsistent in their testimony, seemingly 
because it is assumed that it is difficult to remember and sustain a story that 
is fabricated. Also, when challenged, it is supposed that persons who are lying 
try to save the situation and conceal their inconsistencies by altering the facts. 
Simultaneously, it is also assumed that if applicants actually are genuine in 
their statements and actually have experienced what they recount, then they 
will be able to, largely, recall these events in an accurate and consistent 
manner.83 By contrast, research in the field shows that deceptive consecutive 
accounts are consistent to at least the same extent as truthful statements.84 
That alone raises questions as to the adequacy of using consistency as an 
indicator of credibility.  
It is important to note that memories are not a record of the event themselves 
– they consist of people’s experiences of events. Thus, the content that has 
been stored as a memory, is reflecting the individual’s conscious and 
unconscious experience of what happened and this can furthermore change 
with each recall of the memory.85 When asked to recall memory, the 
reconstructive process itself demands a variety in content and output order. 
Simply put, no two recounts can be identical resulting in that some 
                                                          
81 Ibid. pp. 150-151. 
82 Ibid. p. 152. 
83 Ibid. p. 149. 
84 Pär Anders Granhag, Leif A. Stromwall and Maria Hartwig, ‘Granting Asylum or Not? 
Migration Board Personnel's Beliefs about Deception’ (2005) 31 J Ethn & Migr Stud 29, p. 
43; See also Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum Seekers be Taken as Proof of 
Deceit? (n 71) p. 83; Questions of Credibility (n 62) pp. 293–309. 
85  M Conway, E Holmes, Guidelines on Memory and the Law: Recommendations from the 
Scientific Study of Human Memory (British Psychological Society Press, Leicester 2008) 
(Memory and the Law) p. 2.   
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inconsistency is inevitable.86 Since autobiographical memories are influenced 
by and reconstructed according to what is known, they change over time, 
sometimes significantly. 87 
Another psychological phenomenon that is present in repeated recalls, is 
known as hypermnesia and simply means that people remember more details 
for each time they get to repeat what happened during a certain event.88 
Studies have shown that a second recount of memory will elaborate the 
original version with much new detail added and few verbatim repetitions.89 
Because of this, if new information emerges in the applicant’s testimony, that 
was not provided in an initial interview may not be an indicator of 
inconsistency and thus a lack of credibility – as the legal standards has it – 
but of the normal functional of memory.90 According to certain studies, 
psychologists have considered that a person demonstrates a high degree of 
consistency when directly contradicting 20 per cent of the previous 
statement.91  
The reconstruction of a memory is guided by the context in which it is 
recalled. Accordingly, when we retell events, we may take on different 
perspectives for different purposes and audiences.92 Therefore, if the 
                                                          
86  S Black, L J Levine, T M Laulhere, ‘Autobiographical Remembering and Hypermnesia: 
A Comparison of Older and Younger Adults’ (1999) 14 Psychology and Ageing 671, pp. 
671–682. 
87 Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory (n 63) p. 470. See also, The 
Psychology of Seeking Protection (n 67) pp. 171–192; J Cohen, ‘Errors of Recall and 
Credibility of Testimony: Can Omissions and Discrepancies in Successive Statements 
Reasonably Be Said to Undermine Credibility of Testimony’ (2001) 69 Medico-Legal J, pp. 
25–34. 
88  D G Payne, ‘Hypermnesia and Reminiscence in Recall: A Historical and Empirical 
Review’ 101 (1987) Psychological Bulletin, pp. 5–27; Refugee Status Determinations and 
the Limits of Memory (n 63) p. 495. 
89  S J Anderson, G Cohen, S Taylor, ‘Rewriting the Past: Some Factors Affecting the 
Variability of Personal memorie's’ (2000) 14 Applied Cognitive Psychology 435, pp. 435–
454; J Herlihy, P Scragg, S Turner, ‘Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories: 
Implications for the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: Repeated Interviews Study’ (2002) 
324 British Medical J, pp. 324–327. 
90 Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory, (n 63) p. 496 
91 Ibid. p. 510. 
92 Marita Eastmond, ‘Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration 
Research’ (2007) J Ref Stud 248, pp. 248–264 (Stories as Lived Experiece); B Tversky, E J 
Marsh, ‘Biased Retellings of Events Yield Biased Memories’ (2000) 40 Cognitive 
Psychology, p 1–38; 
23 
 
 
statements are delivered in different circumstances or to different people, the 
inconsistencies can be explained by this natural method of reconstruction.  
When it comes to temporal information and the recalling of it, inconsistency 
between statements that regards those facts is not an indicator of non-
credibility, rather, it is the opposite because of its likelihood of inaccurate 
estimates. For example, if we try to recall the date of an event or describe its 
frequency or duration, we estimate and this estimation is likely to be 
inaccurate. This does not mean that we are lying about the event itself, but 
rather that we are genuinely trying to recall this piece of information from our 
real memory. If asked to describe or date the same event again after a period 
of time, we will again estimate our answer, and it may be different from the 
last time.93 Consequently, inconsistencies as regards temporal information 
may be indicative of the applicant trying to remember his/hers actual 
experience, rather than what he or she has said previously. 
Separate specific instances may fuse to generic or blended memories, and this 
is called ‘schema’.94 This kind of fusion may occur regardless of whether the 
events were significant, mundane or distressing.95 As such, it can be very hard 
to accurately recall separate experiences that have been repeated, and it can 
also lead to entire instances being omitted in the applicant’s testimony.96 
Dissociation due to traumatic events, that results in the applicant being 
distracted or detached may also be explanatory to why there are gaps or 
incoherence in an applicant’s testimony.97  
Lastly, there is undeniable evidence asserting that memories of traumatic 
events – such as sexual violence – differ from normal memories, 98 and that 
                                                          
93 Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory, (n 63) note p. 491; Biased 
Retellings of Events Yield Biased Memories, ibid.; Stories as Lived Experiece, ibid. 
94 J A List, ‘Age and Schematic Differences in Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony’ (1986) 
22 Development Psychology, pp. 50–57. 
95 Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory (n 63) p. 482. 
96  S Bidrose, G S Goodman, ‘Testimony and Evidence: A Scientific Case Study of 
Memory for Child Sexual Abuse’ (2000) 14 Applied Cognitive Psychology 197, p. 209. 
97 The Psychology of Seeking Protection (n 67) p. 178. 
98 Ibid. p. 176; Impact of Sexual Violence on Disclosure during Home Office Interviews (n 
72) pp. 75–81; M Fazel, J Wheeler, J Danesh, ‘Prevalence of Serious Mental Disorder in 
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the need of coping with such experiences affects the memory. 99 Symptoms of 
PTSD include dissociation, sensory encoding, recall deficit, circumscribed 
memory retention, poor concentration and avoidance.100 Also, other forms of 
mental illness effects the ability to recall memories. Applicants suffering from 
depression or an anxiety disorder may experience difficulty in recalling past 
events or recalling events consistently.101 It could also be the case that the 
applicant has not memorized verbal narrative of the occurred trauma, but 
instead only memorized sensory impressions such as sounds, smells, 
emotions, sensations, or visual images like flashbacks and nightmares.102 
Usually these memories cannot be disclosed voluntarily, but are provoked by 
reminders or triggers of the traumatic experience. When this happens, the 
applicant may relive an aspect of the event as though it is presently 
occurring.103 Because of this, such applicants may be incapable of producing 
a coherent verbal narrative because there exists none, resulting in that only 
impressions or fragments of the experience may be conveyed.104 
3.3 Sufficiency of detail and specificity  
“You were also vague about the details. At your substantive interview, you 
admitted that you do not know the dates or days of the week when he abused 
you. You said that he tried to abuse you in Syria but were unable to say 
when or provide any details. It is therefore not accepted that you were 
sexually abused”105 
 
 
                                                          
7000 Refugees Resettled in Western Countries: A Systematic Review’ (2005) 365 Lancet, 
pp. 1309–1314; Questions of Credibility, (n 62) pp. 293–309. 
99 Questions of Credibility, ibid. 
100 Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum Seekers be Taken as Proof of Deceit? (n 
71) p. 85. 
101 Ibid. p. 90; Impact of Sexual Violence on Disclosure during Home Office Interviews (n 
72) pp. 75–81. 
102 C Brewin, J D Gregory, M Lipton, N Burgess, ‘Intrusive Images in Psychological 
Disorders: Characteristics, Neural Mechanisms and Treatment Implications’ (2010) 117 
Psychological Review 210, pp. 210–232; Questions of Credibility, (n 62) pp. 293–309. 
103 The Psychology of Seeking Protection (67) p. 176. 
104 Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum Seekers be Taken as Proof of Deceit? (n 
71) p. 86. 
105 UNCHR’s review of EU Member State case file, cited in Beyond Proof, (n 78) p. 141. 
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3.3.1 Legal standards  
To demonstrate that the claim is not manifestly unfounded, the applicant’s 
statement should be sufficiently detailed and substantively presented, at least 
in respect of the most material facts of the claim, with rare exceptions based 
on the claimant’s incapacity where factors such as age, gender, education or 
other vulnerabilities are relevant.106  
There are examples of national cases, in which decision-makers have 
considered the applicant’s inability to recall a date or duration as an indicator 
that is undermining their credibility. It has been considered as indicative of a 
lack of credibility in cases where the applicants have failed to provide detailed 
answers to questions that are relating to common objects, such as the design 
of coins or identity documents etc. There are also examples of when 
applicants have been expected to recall the details of repeated events. In 
general, sufficiency of detail and specificity is a credibility indicator that is 
commonly relied upon and decision-makers expect a high level of detail that 
the applicant should be able to provide as regards past events and facts. 
Superficial, brief, or vague responses are indicative of non-credibility and so 
is a failure to convey an impression that an experience has been ‘lived’.107  
3.3.2. Psychological research 
Firstly, it has to be noted that research relating to cues to deception shows that 
in general, liars actually do include fewer details in their statements, than 
truth-tellers108 and as such, this credibility indicator does have some scientific 
basis in psychological research. However, there are several situations in 
which this indicator is not applicable: When it comes to temporal information 
(such as dates, times, duration, frequency and sequence), verbatim of verbal 
exchanges; proper names; appearance of common objects; and peripheral 
                                                          
106 Credo Document (n 59) pp. 128, 133; See e.g. Achmadov and Bagurova v. Sweden (App 
no 34081/05) ECHR 10 July 2007, para 20. 
107 Beyond proof (n 78) p. 148. See also Sweden Migration Court of Appeal cases MIG 
2007:12 and MIG 2013:25. 
108 Granting Asylum or Not? Migration Board Personnel's Beliefs about Deception (n 84) 
p. 43. 
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information, these are disreputably unreliable and may be difficult or even 
impossible to recall.109 It has been proven that such details are extremely 
difficult for anyone – not to mention asylum applicants – to recall with any 
accuracy, if at all, even with regard to events that were significant or 
traumatic.110  
An individual’s recall of dates, duration and frequency is almost always 
reconstructed from guesswork and estimation, and is seldom accurate,111 and 
this is the case when it comes to both autobiographical experiences and other 
events.112 If we intentionally commit dates to memory and give them regular 
attention, as some persons do, for example when it comes to anniversaries 
and birthdays, we may be able to accurately recall these dates. However 
research shows that the dates that people commit to memory in this way are 
very personal and that we do not reliably or necessarily commit to memory 
the dates of events, including those emotionally significant or traumatic.113  
According to research, it is also difficult to recall verbal exchanges verbatim, 
as well as proper names.114 Although individuals differ widely in their ability 
to remember proper names, and it is common that we even forget the names 
of acquaintances and friends, some persons have an exceptionally poor ability 
of remembering proper names.115  
As regards common objects such as identity cards, currency etc., studies 
demonstrate that our visual memory is particularly poor because we do not 
record information we deem not to serve any useful function.116 This may also 
be applicable to larger everyday objects such as bridges or buildings. While 
a person’s memory for an environment will be likely to be organized around 
                                                          
109 Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory, (n 63) p. 470; S A 
Christianson and M A Safer, ‘Emotional Events and Emotions in Autobiographical 
Memories’, in D C Rubin (ed.), Remembering our Past: Studies in Autobiographical 
Memory (Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 218–241.    
110 Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory (n. 63) p. 469. 
111 Ibid. pp. 470 and 475. 
112 Ibid. pp. 471–472.  
113 Ibid. p. 473. 
114 Ibid. p. 480. 
115 Ibid. pp. 486–488. 
116 Ibid. p. 480. 
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key landmarks such as a supermarket or monument, this can also distort 
memories of distance, spatial layout and estimates of size. If an applicant is 
failing to accurately or at all describe such common objects, this does not 
necessarily indicate a lack of credibility.117 
Logically, we only tend to recall those aspects of an event that capture our 
attention, usually on a subjective basis. It is unlikely that we would accurately 
remember details diverging from the centre of our focus even if they occurred 
at such a close range so we could still see and hear them. It is therefore not 
reasonable for decision-makers to expect applicants to be able to recall every 
detail of an event, even if those details would be considered as memorable by 
the decision-maker.118 This is especially so when it comes to people who have 
experienced traumatic events, they are likely to remember some details at the 
expense of others. They tend to have a reduced recall of peripheral details, 
and logically, better remember those central details, on which they have 
focused.119 When it comes to peripheral details, scientific studies demonstrate 
that discrepancies may arise more frequently.120  
When it comes to repeated events, it is neither reasonable to expect persons 
to accurately recall the details, as our memories of these repetitive happenings 
are likely to merge into a new generic or fused memories. In addition, in some 
cases earlier memories can be erased and replaced by a more recent, similar 
memory.121 
Applicants who have lived through traumatic events often display symptoms 
of avoidance. Thus they can avoid situations that might trigger a recall, and 
                                                          
117 Memory and the Law (n 85) p. 21. 
118 Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory (n 63) pp. 483-484. 
119 J Herlihy, S Turner, ‘Asylum Claims and Memory of Trauma: Sharing our Knowledge’ 
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avoid to talk and think about the trauma. 122 In order to disclose all relevant 
information in an asylum interview, one would need to suppress this perfectly 
normal coping mechanism and survival strategy and therefore it may be 
extremely distressing and potentially detrimental for the applicant to disclose 
such traumatic memories. 123 Besides, applicants may not even be aware of 
that they are avoiding situations or triggers that could cause traumatic 
memories to recur as this mechanism can be completely subconscious.124 This 
survival strategy may be an explanation to e.g., why an applicant omits 
relevant information from his or her testimony, why an applicant is vague in 
relevant facts, and even why he or she apparently refuses to give an answer a 
question.125 
Another explanation to why the testimony is vague or has a lack of detail can 
be that the applicant suffers from dissociation. 126 Not only can this happen 
during the traumatic event (and thus disturb the memory encoding as 
explained above) but it may also occur when the person is asked to recall a 
traumatic event. This results in the applicant appearing as detached and 
distracted and/or as unwilling of cooperation.127 
Lastly, it is also important to have in mind that a lack of details can also be 
explained by the fact that the applicant may come from a culture where it is 
not valuable or taught to be detailed in memory recalls in the same way as it 
is in the Western cultures.128 Likewise, it is also noteworthy that the theory 
that an individual who is recounting a genuine experience is more expressive 
                                                          
122 Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (n 71); See also Swedish 
Migration Board (Migrationsverket) ‘Gender-Based Persecution: Guidelines for 
Investigation and Evaluation of the Needs of Women for Protection’ (28 March 2001) 
<http://www.refworld.org/publisher,SWE_MIGRATION,,SWE,3f8c1a654,0.html> 
accessed 25 May 2015, p.14. 
123 Should Discrepant Accounts Given by Asylum Seekers be Taken as Proof of Deceit? (n 
71) p. 83. 
124 Just Tell Us What Happened to You (n 67) pp. 661–676. 
125 Impact of Sexual Violence on Disclosure during Home Office Interviews (n 72) pp. 75–
81. 
126 The Psychology of Seeking Protection (n 67) p. 178. 
127 Impact of Sexual Violence on Disclosure during Home Office Interviews (n 72) pp. 75–
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and detailed is based on a Western gender and cultural perspective that may 
be completely alien to others.129 
3.4 Plausibility 
“It is not accepted that a proscribed and illegal terrorist organisation, one 
which would of needed to rely upon secrecy in order to conduct its affairs in 
government controlled areas, would have brazenly walked up to complete 
strangers in order to ask them to join their terrorist organisation. It is 
therefore not accepted that you were contacted by the LTTE as claimed”130 
 
3.4.1 Legal standards 
The claims including explanations by the applicant of alleged past and present 
‘facts’ should be plausible.131 In the framework of the credibility assessment, 
the meaning of the term ‘plausible’ is not clear. A variety of explanations 
have been suggested such as that for statements to be plausible, they should 
be ‘believable and consistent’ and plausible with ‘common sense’.132 
Linguistically, the term means “seeming reasonable or probable”.133 
Similarly, it has been suggested to refer to ‘unlikely events’ or ‘strange or 
remarkable statements’.134  
Notwithstanding all the cautions relating to the application of plausibility as 
a credibility indicator, it appears that jurisdictions are reluctant to discard it 
completely. There are examples of domestic case officer guidance and cases 
that demonstrates a widespread reliance on plausibility as a credibility 
indicator.135 
 
                                                          
129 Ibid. 
130 United Kingdom Home Office Refusal Letter concerning an asylum seeker from Sri 
Lanka, cited in A Question of Credibility (n 74) p. 17. 
131 Qualification Directive (n 59) article 5(4)(c); See also Handbook (n 76) para. 204; Note 
on Burden and Standard of Proof (n 76) para. 11. 
132 Beyond proof (n 78) citing the European Asylum Curriculum, Module 7, section 3.2. 
133 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Plausible’ <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/plausible> 
accessed 25 May 2015.  
134 Beyond proof (n 78) citing the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Netherlands) 
Working Instruction 2010/14, paragraph 4.1(c). 
135 Beyond Proof (n 78) p. 181; see also Swedish Migration Court of Appeal, MIG 2007:37. 
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3.4.2 Psychological research  
According to psychology, we make judgments by referring to our own past 
experiences, and when faced with a new and complex situation, we make 
these judgments by comparing the new circumstances with another more 
simple set of circumstances, already known by us.136 It is these mechanisms 
that are predominantly at work when we are relying on ‘common sense’ to 
make judgments.137 The danger with this combination of our second-hand 
experiences and our past is that it can only give us a limited understanding of 
human behaviour and experience, leaving us at risk with considering the facts 
that do fall outside this personal sphere of experiences, background, values, 
views and culture as implausible.138 
How we react to circumstances is often unpredictable and very wide-ranging, 
and this is particularly so for those who have had to face and endure situations 
that are extremely traumatic and stressful. Decision-makers within the asylum 
procedure, however, confront this wide spectrum of human behaviour and 
experiences from various unfamiliar cultures on a daily basis. Also, it has 
been proposed that some of our intuition is drawn on expertise and skills 
acquired through recurrent experiences.139 Nonetheless, these intuitions are 
only accurate if applied in a context that is sufficiently regular to be rendered 
predictable, and when there is a chance to identify its regularities.140 
You can only “learn-by-doing” when you get feedback on which decisions 
were correct, which incorrect, and on what grounds, which is not usually 
possible in the asylum procedure. Lacking this feedback, ‘expert decision 
makers’ tend to become more and more reliant on stereotypes and incorrect 
beliefs.141 Therefore, in the particular context in which asylum decision-
                                                          
136 D Kahneman, A Tversky, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 
185 Science, New Series, pp. 1124–1131; D. Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Allen 
Lane, London 2011) pp. 12 and 97. 
137 The Psychology of Seeking Protection (n 67) p.190; Thinking Fast and Slow, ibid. 
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makers work, there is a real risk that they may rely on judgments that are 
subjective and that are simply drawing on their own experiences in life.142 If 
we resort to ‘common sense’ in our judgment, we do not have an effective 
means of actually judging the plausibility of events, and this is particularly so 
when it comes to countries, cultures and societies that differ widely from our 
own.143 
3.5 Demeanour 
“You did not seem authentic regarding the way of speaking and gave the 
impression that you did not actually experience what you stated.”144 
 
3.5.1 Legal standards 
Demeanour as an indicator of credibility regards a person’s manner and 
outward behaviour, including his/hers manners of acting, expression or reply 
– for example if they are evasive, hesitant, confident, reticent, direct or 
spontaneous – modulation or pace of speech, eye contact, physical posture, 
tone of voice, facial expression, emotion, and other communication that is 
non-verbal. The use of this credibility indicator seems to be based on an 
assumption that specific demeanours are suggestive of credibility and 
truthfulness while others are indicative of non-credibility and deception, for 
example how the applicant stands or sits, the colouration of the skin during 
difficult questions, the pace of the speech, and the nervousness in general.145 
Several courts have indeed regarded the applicant’s demeanour during the 
personal interview and the manner in which the applicant has conveyed 
his/her testimony as relevant to the credibility assessment.146 Even the ECtHR 
                                                          
142 Thinking Fast and Slow (n 136) p. 185. 
143 W Kälin, ‘Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-
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seems to implicitly accept that an applicant’s demeanour is a factor to be taken 
into account as part of the assessment of credibility: 
“[The Court] accepts that, as a general principle, the national authorities 
are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the 
credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, 
hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned”147 
Several member state’s case officer-guidance manuals do include cautions 
signifying that the indicator is unreliable and highlights what factors that 
should be borne in mind. Nonetheless, in the long run they still do permit the 
application of demeanour as an indicator, often in combination with other 
credibility indicators.148  
Despite the fact that it has been recommended that it should be avoided in 
virtually all situations to use demeanour as a factor in credibility assessments, 
it must be acknowledged that in reality, it can always have some influence in 
an oral hearing. Most of the European jurisdictions do have an oral hearing, 
and a major reason for this is so that the judges can ‘see and hear’ the 
applicant.149  
3.5.2. Psychological research 
Extensive psychological research demonstrates that the things that people 
assume are clues of deception – such as being hesitant, gaze aversion and 
more hand movements – are not actually connected to lying.150 In addition, 
while there is clearly always a risk of misinterpreting an individual’s 
demeanour, this is particularly dangerous in the context of cross-cultural 
communication, since demeanour varies between cultures.151  For example, in 
                                                          
147  R.C. v. Sweden (n 77) para. 52. 
148 Beyond Proof (n 78) pp. 189-190 
149 Assessment of Credibility: Judicial Criteria and Standards (n 76) p. 42.  
150 Global Deception Research Team ‘A World of Lies’ (2006) 37 J Cross-Cultural 
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Western culture, a lack of eye contact is often associated with dishonesty, 
while in fact an applicant may behave this way because of his/her fearfulness 
or shy personality. It could also mirror the applicant’s culture – which may 
perhaps be connected to age or gender – and indicate deference or respect to 
an authoritative person.152 Another classic example is that in some countries 
nodding the head can indicate affirmation, while in others it can indicate 
negation.153 
Besides, research demonstrates that the behavioural signs that people are 
looking for when it comes to deception may equate those behavioural signs 
of anxiety (based on the assumption that someone who lies would be 
nervous).154 This is clearly problematical in the asylum context, where the 
applicant may have a good reason to be and to seem nervous. An asylum 
seeker’s manner of expression can appear to be confused or fragmented, not 
because he or she is not telling the truth, but because he or she is insecure, 
stressed or anxious. This is perfectly normal, considering that the stakes are 
so high. An applicant can be bewildered by the new cultural and social 
environment and by the process at large.155 It is also important to have in mind 
that the interviewer’s attitude can affect the applicant’s manner, in the way 
that the interviewer structures and directs interaction with the applicant.156 
Also, applicants who have traumatic experiences are prone to display many 
symptoms that might impact their demeanour. It may appear strange for those 
who are unfamiliar with psychological survival strategies, i.e. coping 
                                                          
152 US Citizenship and Immigration Services, ‘Asylum Officer Basic Training Module on 
Gender-Related Claims’ (October 2012) 
<http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asyl
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mechanisms such as smiling, grinning, laughing or deep silence, when 
applicants react in this way to certain questions.157 
Studies also show that decision-makers frequently base their findings of 
credibility on inaccurate, inappropriate and stereotypical perceptions about 
female applicants’ demeanour.158 Decision-makers tend to believe those 
asylum seekers who are expressing their emotions in expected manners, e.g., 
if a victim of rape is being visibly distressed.159 However, the level and type 
of emotion that is revealed by female applicants during their recounting of 
their experiences should not be used as a credibility indicator of their 
statements.160 It does not necessarily mean that a lack of displayed emotions 
equates that the person is not deeply affected or distressed by what has 
happened.161 Those who have experienced traumatic events may demonstrate 
emotional numbing since they detach themselves emotionally from the events 
that they are recounting. They can appear as to be indifferent, which in turn 
could, without an understanding of this coping mechanism, be mistakenly 
interpreted as indicative of non-credibility. 162 
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4. Case study: Sweden  
 
4.1 Introduction and soft law  
“The Migration Board notes that there are credibility flaws in your case. In 
the interrogation report from the police you claimed to have had your own 
business within the construction crafts and in the pleading from your legal 
counsel you claim to have had a fast food-kiosk. At the personal interview 
you state that you have never claimed to have a company within the 
construction crafts and that what is stated in the pleading is the correct 
claim. The Migration Board finds it remarkable that you have changed 
these statements. Furthermore, you claimed in the interrogation report from 
the police that you would ask your uncles to send you your mother’s death 
certificate. At the personal interview you claimed that there was never 
issued a death certificate for your mother. The Migration Board finds it 
remarkable that you have changed these statements”163 
UNHCR conducted a study in cooperation with the Swedish Migration Board 
during 2009-2011 which included the field of credibility assessment. Their 
study revealed that 38% of their reviewed cases were rejected because of 
adverse credibility findings.164 The study also revealed that the case officers 
often made their own subjective assumptions of what they thought would be 
plausible in the given situations and used so called speculative arguments.165  
The Swedish legislation does not contain any provisions as regards the 
credibility assessment in asylum procedures. However during the 
incorporation process of the Qualification Directive from 2004, in 2006 the 
Department of Justice submitted a report that stated that the credibility 
assessment should not be focused on the applicant’s general credibility, but 
on the credibility of the applicant’s statements that are relevant in assessing 
the risk scenarios associated with refouler.166 The Migration Courts have also 
                                                          
163 (Author’s own interpretation) Swedish Migration Board, Refusal Letter, cited in; Liv 
Feijen & Emelia Frennmark, Kvalitet i svensk asylprövning: en studie av Migrationsverkets 
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assessment of several cases focused on irrelevant aspects.  
164 Ibid. p. 192. 
165 Ibid. pp. 192-193. 
166 Swedish Government Official Reports, SOU 2006:6, p. 234. 
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provided some guidance in their case law, as will be explained in the section 
below.  
Up until recently, the Migration Board did not have any guidance document 
on the subject either.167 Consequently, the Migration Board’s Judicial Position 
concerning the method for examining reliability and credibility from 2013 
(the Judicial Position) filled that gap. The Judicial Positions issued by the 
Migration Board are not legally binding, but are considered an authoritative 
guidance for staff of the Board.  
The Judicial Position affirms what has been stated in the above mentioned 
report from the Department of Justice, i.e. that the credibility assessment 
should focus on the veracity of the applicant’s statements, and not the general 
credibility of the applicant.168 The Migration Board chooses to elaborate on 
this by referring to a terminology that has also been used in Swedish witness 
psychology, namely that credibility relates to the way in which the evidence 
is provided and that the veracity of the testimony is called reliability. The 
Judicial Position points out that in the Swedish case law the terminology is 
used interchangeably, but it clarifies that the Migration Board’s assignment 
is to make an objective assessment of the reliability of the applicant’s 
testimony. However while it also mentions that there might be a need to make 
an assessment of whether the claims have been conveyed in a credible way as 
a next step in the decision-making process, it states that the reliability 
assessment is superior to the credibility assessment. According to the Judicial 
Position, this second step in the decision-making process does not relate to 
the way in how the testimony is presented in the form of e.g. the applicant’s 
gestures or gaze unless these indicators can be objectively assessed. On the 
other hand what the credibility assessment is supposed to take into account is 
e.g. whether the applicant does not answer certain questions that have been 
asked several times without him/her being able to explain why.169 
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168 Ibid. at p. 3. 
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Based on case law the Judicial Position states the following indicators of 
reliability:  
 “Is the story coherent or fragmented? 
 
 Is the story concrete and detailed or is it vague and lacking in 
details? 
 
 Does the story consist of inconsistent statements or has it mainly 
been unchanged during the process? 
 
 Is the story supported by generally known facts and up-to-date COI 
or is the story externally inconsistent?”170 
The Migration Board also states that it is important that the method of 
evidentiary assessment never is based on subjectivity, arbitrariness and 
intuition. It also stresses the necessity of the decision-maker to have a good 
COI knowledge so that the decision-maker can put him-/herself in the cross-
country situation and not assume that authorities and other actors would react 
in the same way as they would in a democratic state with a functioning rule 
of law. It is also noted that it is necessary to take into account the applicant’s 
personal circumstances and that a person who have lived through war, 
violence and serious threats can have a hard time in remembering certain 
details and have problems with coherent recounts.171  
The Judicial Position also emphasizes that a decision should be made ‘in the 
round’, analysing all different evidentiary themes unless one particular theme 
would nullify the whole testimony e.g. that regarding 
identity/citizenship/home country. The Migration Board also states that if 
adverse reliability findings are made that regards the relevant parts of the 
story, the applicant should have the opportunity to explain them.172  
It is noted that the final assessment should focus on the following core 
questions: 
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“a) Do the flaws concern the core aspects of the claim? 
b) Are the explanations given to these flaws plausible? 
c) Does the applicant’s conduct in the asylum procedure pose serious 
reasons to question the basis of the claim? 
d) Is the applicant’s explanation to his/hers conduct plausible?”173 
It is also mentioned that those applicants whose decision contains adverse 
reliability findings have the right to a well-motivated decision. Therefore, if 
decision-makers choose to use expressions such as ‘vague and lacking in 
detail’, they must be supplemented with an explanation of what exactly was 
vague and lacking in detail, and why it is expected that the applicant should 
be able to provide more details in that specific part. Lastly the Migration 
Board points out that if the applicant is not credible because the claims have 
not been presented in a credible way, this could be a part of the assessment, 
but not without adverse reliability findings as well.174  
Despite the issued Judicial Position, asylum lawyers have voiced concern that 
it has not been followed by the Migration Board, nor has it been given any 
particular attention in the Courts.175   
4.2 Case law  
4.2.1. MIG 2007:12 
In this landmark case for Swedish credibility assessments in the asylum 
procedure, the applicant claimed that he was wanted by the authorities 
because he had been active in the opposition against the regime since he was 
driven by revenge after they had killed his brothers. He was first denied 
asylum at the first instance by the Migration Board, then granted asylum after 
appeal by the Migration Court – which stated that his account was credible – 
                                                          
173 Ibid. p. 10 (author’s own translation). 
174 Ibid. 
175 Rashin Fardnicklasson & Lars Fardnicklasson, ’Dags för Migrationsverket att följa det 
egna ställningstagandet – så här ska det tillämpas’ Dagens Juridik (11 June 2014) 
<http://www.dagensjuridik.se/2014/06/dags-migrationsverket-att-folja-det-egna-
stallningstagandet-sa-har-ska-det-tillampas> accessed 27 April 2015. 
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and lastly, his application was denied by the Migration Court of Appeal (The 
Court) because his statements were not considered to be credible.176  
The Court first broadly asserted that when assessing the credibility in the 
applicant’s testimony, weight should be given to whether the story is coherent 
and not characterized by conflicting statements. The Court further stated that 
it is important that the main features of the story remains unchanged during 
the different instances in the asylum procedure.177 
When assessing the credibility of the applicant’s statement, the Court asserted 
in general that his story was vague and remarkably lacking in detail. For 
example, the Court mentioned that he was not able to give any specific details 
as regards when or how he got his alleged physical injuries. The Court also 
noted that he was utterly vague as regards the circumstances of the protests 
that he allegedly participated in. It was also mentioned that the applicant in 
some respect had changed his story both during the interview at the Migration 
Board and during the Court proceedings. The Court also stated that he was 
inconsistent in his statements regarding his participation in the anti-regime 
organization: for example, at several times he had said that he always acted 
with caution and tried to stay away in order to not draw attention to his 
connections with the organization; this was contradictory to his statements 
regarding his participations in public protests and delivery of leaflets, which, 
according to himself, was associated with big risks. Additionally, the Court 
took note of the fact that the applicant stated not to have had any actual contact 
with the organization, but at the same time, he claimed that it was the 
organization that helped him escape.178  
4.2.2. MIG 2007:33 
This case concerned a Yezidi Kurd from Iraq who claimed to have been in 
love with his cousin and wanted to marry her, whereas the bride’s father 
opposed to the marriage. The applicant claimed to have fled with his cousin 
                                                          
176 Migration Court of Appeal, Case No. UM 540-06, MIG 2007:12 (19 march 2007) 
<http://www.notisum.se/rnp/domar/mg/MG007012.htm> accessed 27 April 2015. 
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to another city where they got married but when the cousin’s family found 
out, she was killed by her brother. The applicant said he fled to Sweden 
because he feared for his life. The applicant’s claim was rejected by the 
Migration Board because of adverse credibility findings. When he appealed, 
the Migration Court accepted his testimony as credible and granted him 
asylum. However, at the Migration Board’s appeal, the Migration Court of 
Appeal rejected his application because – as in the first instance – his 
testimony was not deemed to be credible.179 
The Court stated that the applicant was inconsistent in his testimony in 
regards whether he and his girlfriend were married and on which date they 
had eloped. The Court also found it particularly remarkable that the applicant 
was floating in his answers to which day it was that the girl had been 
murdered. It was also noted by the Court that he was inconsistent as to where 
they had been living after they eloped, on the one hand he mentioned that they 
had stayed at different hotels and on the other hand he said that they had 
stayed in the same house but in different rooms. Furthermore, the Court noted 
that he had ‘stepped up his story’ during the oral hearing at the Migration 
Court by revealing for the first time that also his own family was against him 
and would not protect him. The last adverse credibility finding by the Court 
was based on the fact that he had several times submitted that he was 
analphabetic but that he had also stated that he went to school for two years, 
and that he was a businessman.180   
4.2.3 MIG 2011:8 
In this case, a woman claimed to risk persecution if returned to Somaliland. 
She claimed to be born and raised in Somaliland in a strictly religious family. 
She had two children, whose father was deceased. After the death of her 
husband she met another man with whom she initiated a sexual relation and 
became pregnant in 2002. When one of her half-brothers heard about the 
                                                          
179 Migration Court of Appeal, Case No. UM 837-06, MIG 2007:33 (15 June 2007) 
<http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=16806> accessed 27 
April 2015. 
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pregnancy he stabbed her since she was perceived as to have brought 
dishonour over the family. After this she claimed to have been persecuted and 
forced to move from place to place in order to avoid getting stoned. When she 
heard in 2009 that her relatives were looking for her together with Al Shabab 
in the area where she was currently living, she left the country.181  
Both the Migration Board and the Migration Court strongly questioned the 
applicant’s testimony and she was not deemed to be credible. In the last 
instance, the Migration Board pleaded that her testimony was unclear in 
several regards and that her claims of living in certain places could be 
questioned. The Migration Board also stated that it was not credible that her 
relatives allegedly first found her in 2009. However the Migration Court of 
Appeal disagreed, and stated that her testimony in general had been coherent 
and unchanged. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the explanations 
given by her relating to the uncertainties supported that she had lived through 
what she had told. Furthermore, after a thorough review of COI, the Court 
concluded that the fact that her testimony was not externally inconsistent also 
contributed to why her claim was deemed credible.182  
4.3 Analysis 
4.3.1 The Migration Board’s Judicial Position  
In the 2009-2011 study that the UNHCR conducted in regards of Swedish 
practice in credibility assessment, what was most striking was that in several 
cases the claims were rejected because of minor inconsistency flaws not 
relating to the core aspect of the story, and also that the case officers often 
made their own subjective assumptions of plausibility using speculative 
arguments. Hopefully, the application of the recent Judicial Position will 
redeem these faults in the procedure since it states that adverse credibility 
findings should only be given weight if they relate to the core aspects of the 
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applicant’s claim. When it comes to the application of plausibility as an 
indicator it is not mentioned in the list of indicators, however – implicitly – 
the Migration Board seems resistant in rejecting it completely since it 
mentions the necessity of decision-makers having a good knowledge in COI 
so that they can put themselves in cross-country situations and not assume 
that e.g. state authorities in Afghanistan would react in the same way as they 
do in Sweden. However even with a thorough COI-knowledge, plausibility is 
still a highly subjective factor to consider – as research has shown, the way 
that our mind works when it comes to ‘common sense judgments’, can only 
give us a limited understanding and this emanates in a risk of subjective 
judgments as to what is plausible and what is not. In addition ‘expert-
decision-makers’ who have been working within the area for several years, 
and presumably has a very good knowledge in COI face the risk of giving the 
COI too much weight – just because a certain piece of information states that 
in general e.g. Afghan women tend to be very dependable on their male 
relatives and barely ever leave the house doesn’t mean that there is no 
exception. Plausibility is also mentioned as a relevant factor in the final 
assessment where the applicant’s explanations to the found credibility flaws 
should be plausible – but what is a plausible explanation and what is not? 
These kind of lacking definitions heighten the risk of arbitrary and subjective 
decisions.  
A baby step in the right direction concerns the Judicial Position’s view on 
demeanour, in which it states that the credibility assessment does not relate 
to e.g. applicant’s gestures and gaze. However it is noteworthy that just as in 
other jurisdictions – the Swedish Migration Board is not ready of completely 
disregarding the indicator since it states that such indicators can be used if 
they can be objectively assessed. As has been demonstrated by psychological 
research indicators relating to demeanour cannot be objectively assessed. 
Another disappointing aspect of the Judicial Position is that it does not 
mention the dangers of using the credibility indicators in relation to temporal 
information since this is directly contradictory to psychological research.  
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It is positive that the Judicial Position stresses that the applicant’s personal 
circumstances need to be taken into account and that it recognizes that persons 
who have lived through horrible events can have a hard time remembering 
details or present their story in a coherent way. While this is a step in the right 
direction, the question is how much of a difference this will make in practice, 
since the Judicial Position is still lacking clear definitions on e.g. how detailed 
a story is expected to be, and how much less detailed it is expected to be by 
people who are e.g. suffering from PTSD. This is, once again, paving the way 
to a risk of subjective and arbitrary decisions. The application of the Judicial 
Position might however partly redeem this flaw in the future since it also 
states that the decisions should be well motivated – with more well-articulated 
and well-motivated decisions, definitions of what the indicators really mean 
might subsequently appear. Hopefully this will be applied in the Courts as 
well, which are arguably short in their reasoning. The fact that asylum lawyers 
have voiced concern that the standards in the Judicial Position have not been 
applied yet is indeed alarming, however it is too early to draw any conclusions 
on that matter.   
4.3.2 Case law  
As for the case law, no comments on the substantive parts in the different 
cases will be made since this would need an in-depth analysis of the case 
facts. However some general comments will be made in order to contrast the 
court’s findings with the psychological research that has been presented in 
chapter 3:  
It is noteworthy that in MIG 2007:12, the Court saw it as a sign of non-
credibility that the applicant could not give details as to when he got his 
injuries. Also in MIG 2007:33, the Court used inconsistency in relation to 
temporal information as an indicator of non-credibility, as regards the 
applicant’s incapability of answering on which date they had eloped and on 
which date that his wife was murdered. This is contrasted by clear 
psychological findings stating that inconsistency of temporal information 
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could rather be a sign of credibility because of the high risk of truthful 
statements in this context to consist of inaccurate estimates.  
Besides the Court referring to temporal information, other statements have 
been made that are in contrast to psychological research: In MIG 2007:12, the 
Court also states that the statements are not credible since the applicant had 
been inconsistent and in some respect changed his story both during the 
interview at the Migration Board and during the Court proceedings. As has 
been mentioned, because of the reconstructive process in memory recall, 
some inconsistency is inevitable, if asked to recall the same events several 
times. The fact that we adjust our recount to different types of audiences may 
also play an important part: surely, the context of the personal interview with 
the case officer at the Migration Board was very much different from the 
environment at the Migration Court of Appeal, in front of a judge.   
In MIG 2011:8, the Court questioned the plausibility of the applicant’s 
statement when she alleged that after her initial flight in 2002, it took seven 
years for her relatives to find her. The Migration Board does not give any 
further explanation as to why this could not be plausible. Did the Migration 
Board rely on some sort of subjective common sense or stereotypical 
assumptions evolved by ‘expert-decision-makers’? Anyway, it was 
reassuring to see that the Court countered this with the fact that her testimony 
was not externally inconsistent with COI, and thus it based its assessment on 
objective facts, and not subjective speculations.  
In MIG 2007:33, the Court argued for the applicant’s non-credibility in 
relation to matters not relating to the core aspects of the applicant’s case, i.e. 
that he claimed to be analphabetic but at the same time an educated 
businessman. How would this affect the truthfulness as regards the events he 
allegedly fled from?  
It is also interesting that in all three cases, the credibility findings differed 
from instance to instance. While different findings in different instances 
certainly occur in other judicial procedures as well – as this is the whole point 
of an appeal system – the discrepant findings in these and other asylum cases 
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relating to credibility could very well be the result of a lack of definitions of 
the credibility indicators as well as a lack of guidance on how to use them in 
relation to one another. This in turn can lead to an increased risk of arbitrary 
procedures where similar cases are treated differently, on a subjective basis.  
This lack of guidance in how to weigh the different indicators is also well 
displayed in the cases exemplified in the case study. In MIG 2007:12, the 
Court first states that the indicators to be used in credibility assessments are 
those relating to a coherent story that has been unchanged during the 
procedure and is without conflicting statements. With other words – 
consistency. However when assessing the particular facts of the applicant’s 
case, the Court also says that the level of detail is important. The Migration 
Board argues in MIG 2011:8 that the applicant’s claims were unclear and 
certain facts implausible. The Court on the other hand, doesn’t even respond 
to the Migration Boards arguments in relation to these indicators, instead it 
states that the applicant’s statements were coherent and unchanged. In this 
sense, the Court fails to serve its purpose as an appeal court – while it corrects 
the previous decision, it should do so with a clear reasoning, otherwise, what 
is the value of the precedent? MIG 2007:33 uses only inconsistency as an 
indicator in their argument as to why the applicant’s testimony is not credible. 
What about the other indicators? Were these ‘criteria’ fulfilled, and if so why 
does the indicator of consistency weigh more than the others? Those kind of 
explanations would be desirable to read from the Court’s reasoning.  
Overall, hopefully the case study served its purpose – to show that examples 
of ‘best practice’183 can also be flawed.  
  
                                                          
183 See section 1.4, above. 
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5. Main findings & further discussion 
5.1 Whether the indicators are compatible with scientific 
research and the dangers of inaccurate and inadequate 
assessments  
5.1.1 Initial remarks: for the law to be just, it should take account 
of science  
What can be said to be the general finding in this project is that, largely, the 
credibility indicators that are used in the asylum procedure are based on 
assumptions about human memory, behaviour, attitudes, values etc. that have 
little or no certain basis in scientific research. To ignore relevant 
psychological research risks denying protection to genuine asylum-seekers, 
as well as granting asylum to those who do not meet the criteria for 
international protection status. This is not only detrimental for today’s 
potentially flawed asylum decisions that may send a person back to his/hers 
certain death, but also for how future generations will look upon us. During 
the dark ages and the witch-hunts in Europe, the trials would determine if the 
woman was a witch or not by the water-test: the woman was thrown in the 
water with her hands and feet tied. If she would float, she was obviously a 
witch and would be sentenced to death. If not, she was not a witch, but she 
would still have drowned. Today we look back upon these procedures with 
detest. How will the European society in 100-200 years from now look back 
upon how we were adjudicating asylum claims? Today, in contrast to the 
witch-trials, we have science that in some instances directly contradicts what 
we are using as indicators of credibility, and these findings were not 
demonstrated yesterday, some of them are more than 30 years old! Yet, not 
much has changed – what is the excuse?  
The indicators of credibility are based on assumed norms – rape victims cry; 
liars avoid eye contact; truth-tellers are consistent in their stories; but not too 
consistent because then they are potential liars with a rehearsed account etc. 
While the psychological research demonstrates that these assumptions are 
usually not true, it also shows that very much is subjective and differs from 
individual to individual – some people remember names and dates better than 
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others; some are more verbally gifted and can express their whole life-story 
in a coherent and chronological manner while others have difficulties 
describing yesterday’s events; some people are afraid and nervous in front of 
authoritative figures, some are not; some of us react with crying when 
nervous, others by laughing; some decision-makers might find what 
happened to you as plausible while to others it might seem as highly unlikely, 
etc. If there is no norm, or no common denominator upon which our practice 
is based on, is it even valid to use these indicators at all? Arguably not, if the 
law does not take the science into account, then it is not justice, it is just as 
immoral and wrong as were the witch-trials. However what are the 
alternatives? Somehow, the decision-makers must assert the facts in the case 
by deciding what is true and what is not. As long as States want to maintain 
a controlled immigration, methods for distinguishing genuine protection 
seekers from fraudulent applicants are plainly needed as it cannot be denied 
that the asylum system can be abused by economic or other migrants who do 
not have the right to attain international protection. 
5.1.2 Consistency and coherence: practices contradicting both 
psychology and legal standards  
What is most remarkable with this indicator is that according to the legal 
practices, truth-tellers are expected to be consistent but at the same time, so 
are liars if they have rehearsed their story enough. In a bizarre way, one could 
actually argue for that this is reflected in psychological research as it shows 
that truth-tellers and liars are quite equally consistent in their accounts. But 
once again since the science says that it’s not one way nor the other, it is 
highly questionable that consistency should be used as an indicator, especially 
considering all the empirical evidence submitting several reasons to why an 
applicant could be inconsistent but still be telling the truth e.g. because of 
hypermnesia, fused memories of similar events, and PTSD-symptoms.  
The psychological explanation as regards the context-dependant 
reconstruction of memory is particularly interesting, since applicants are 
required to be internally consistent in the different instances. As it is described 
that we reconstruct our memory differently in different environments and in 
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front of different audiences this could very well explain why an applicant says 
one thing in e.g. a police interrogation and another in the asylum interview: it 
could simply be a result of the police officer being a more authoritative and 
intimidating figure than the asylum case officer. Another example is 
differences in testimony between the asylum interview and subsequent court 
proceedings, which could be explained by the totally different environments 
and persons involved. As has been mentioned above in chapter 4.3.2, this 
could very well explain the inconsistencies of the applicant in MIG 2007:12. 
What is quite remarkable is the fact that the most common inconsistency that 
is cited as undermining credibility relates to temporal information and this is 
directly contradicting psychological research; it is also interesting that there 
are cases in which minor inconsistencies have been used in favour to reject 
the whole core aspects of an applicant’s claim, not only because it is in 
contradiction to psychological research but also because it is in contradiction 
to what has been repeatedly stressed by international and national judicial 
organs.184   
5.1.3 Sufficiency of detail and specificity: some scientific basis, 
but should still be used with caution 
There are cases in which lack of detailed explanations in how a certain 
currency looks like have been deemed as indicative of non-credibility. While 
psychological research has refuted the usage of this because our visual 
memory is particularly poor since we do not record information that we do 
not deem to serve any useful function, one may wonder, do we even need 
empirical evidence to establish that? With the risk of being speculative: 
probably most of us would not be able to describe what our state’s 100 
SEK/EUR/USD bill looks like in any detail, unless you’re a collector or 
you’re working in a bank.  
While the indicator of credibility relating to sufficiency of detail, in general 
has a scientific basis since truth-tellers tend to be more detailed than liars, the 
example above and many more that were presented (e.g. regarding temporal 
                                                          
184 See footnote 79-80, above. 
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information, verbatim of verbal exchange and proper names) are arguably 
more than enough to voice for caution if we are supposed to keep using this 
indicator.   
Another question that is worth looking further into relates to whether it is 
ethically correct to demand from people who have lived through the most 
horrific experiences and may suffer from PTSD and avoidance symptoms, to 
suppress their natural coping mechanism and survival strategy in order for 
them to disclose all relevant details, since this has been proven to be 
extremely distressing and even potentially harmful for people.  
5.1.4 Plausibility: highly subjective and risk of stereotypical 
judgments  
This indicator is probably one of the more controversial ones – except for 
demeanour – since it invites to a highly subjective assessment. And once 
again, despite of all the voiced concerns questioning the use of plausibility as 
an indicator, the legal sphere is as stubborn as always and jurisdictions are 
reluctant to discard it completely.  
Firstly there is a risk that decision-makers would deem events to be 
implausible because of their judgment based on their own, westernized 
background. How can a person growing up in Sweden that haven’t seen war 
in the last two hundred years have any clue of what is reasonable or not in 
war-torn Syria? Or how could a decision-maker – assuming there is lacking 
COI in the field – possibly know what is a plausible conduct of an Afghan 
woman suffering domestic violence? Secondly, as was mentioned, there is 
also a risk that ‘expert decision-makers’ that have been around for years 
instead base their judgment on stereotypes for certain ethnicities – Somalians 
act in this way while Iraqis tend to behave like that… Just as every Swede 
would not behave and act in the same way in a given situations, individuals 
from other countries react in different ways to similar situations.     
5.1.5 Demeanour: still used, despite caution 
The usage of demeanour as an indicator of credibility is clearly risky; there 
are cross-cultural factors to be taken into account; there are psychological 
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factors to be taken into account (for example coping mechanisms) and the 
behavioural signs that we tend to look for when it comes to deceptions are 
usually the same ones that indicate anxiety. Another factor shredding light on 
the inadequacy of the indicator is the fact that the case officer’s attitudes, both 
consciously and unconsciously, can affect the applicant’s manner: some case 
officers can come across as authoritative while others strike you as more 
friendly; and inexperienced or nervous case officers can in turn make the 
applicant even more nervous. Other factors relating to the case officer may 
also be of importance, e.g. the gender.  
Just like plausibility, assessing the demeanour is highly subjective and while 
it is noteworthy that several Member State’s case officer-guidance manuals 
include cautions signifying that the indicator is unreliable but still permits its 
usage; it is even more remarkable that the ECtHR accepted its usage in its 
case R.C v. Sweden. One could arguably expect more from the world’s most 
developed human rights court in the 21st century.   
5.1.6 Concluding remarks regarding the credibility indicators and 
its pitfalls  
Besides the fact that the credibility indicators are largely incompatible with 
psychological research, there are other factors regarding the credibility 
assessment which can question the accuracy and adequacy of the procedure. 
For example, while the certain indicators can be identified, there are no 
instructions on how to weigh the individual indicators – are they all equally 
important? For instance if a testimony is very consistent and coherent but at 
the same time it is rather lacking in details in certain aspect, what do you do 
then? Do you even have to consider all of the indicators?  
Because there are no guidelines on how the selection of credibility indicators 
should be made, the different adjudicators can pick and choose from the 
different criteria as they see fit, and since there is no guidance, chances are 
that the different adjudicators may choose different criteria if they were to – 
hypothetically – handle the same case and their decisions would then not rest 
on the same grounds, making the decisions highly subjective. The examples 
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of cases in the Swedish case study particularly highlighted this issue and 
consequently, the adjudicators may come to different conclusions about the 
credibility of the testimony which would make the procedure arbitrary. 
Another similar concern is that while the indicators are identified, they are 
not clearly defined – e.g. where do you draw the line between detailed and 
vague; what exactly is a coherent statement? – which, by the same logic as 
described above, can lead to different subjective interpretations and decisions 
about the same case, resulting in an arbitrary procedure.  
Lastly, since a presumable large part of those who seek international 
protection suffer from different psychological problems like PTSD it is 
extremely questionable to use criteria of credibility that for them are almost 
impossible to achieve. This in turn could arguably result in that the state is 
systematically discriminating against this group of people.  
5.2 Recommendations  
5.2.1 Regional level 
In order to improve the accuracy and legal certainty of credibility assessment 
in the asylum procedure, what is firstly needed is extensive psychological 
research within the specific area of asylum. A thorough investigation of what 
parts from the area of criminal law that can be analogically applied to the 
sphere of asylum is also need – but these aspects should also be compatible 
witch psychological research.  
After a thorough preparatory work consisting of these and other possible 
investigations and researches, it would be desirable to draft an instrument in 
addition to the already existing CEAS acquis. This instrument would need to 
lay down in well-defined and explicit forms, what indicators – with a 
scientific basis – of credibility that should be used, and how these indicators 
relate to each other. The instrument should also identify certain vulnerable 
groups such as applicants with PTSD, women, minors, LGBTI-people etc., 
and specify what special regards that needs to be taken into account when 
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faced with such cases. It would also be desirable to prepare some form of 
training module on an EU-level on this new instrument.  
5.2.2 Domestic level 
What has been recommended so far, is a long-term project demanding both 
time, resources and political will. Until we reach that point, change can start 
in domestic jurisdictions, e.g. in ambitious asylum-countries like Sweden. In 
Sweden’s case, the judgments regarding credibility assessment have, as 
stated, not provided an extensive guidance on how to use the different 
credibility indicators. This uncodified sphere gives room for the following 
possible recommendations:  
 That as many credibility indicators as possible should be used 
in order to make ‘in the round’ judgments and only credibility 
flaws relating to the ‘core’ of the applicant’s statements should 
be taken into account (not minor flaws relating to irrelevant 
facts). 
 
 That credibility flaws relating to temporal information should 
be disregarded.  
 
 That in cases regarding an applicant who claims to have been 
e.g. abused, tortured, interrogated etc. in repeated instances, the 
expectations of the level of consistency and detail when it comes 
to those separate instances should be lowered.  
 
 That in cases regarding facts relating to the appearance of 
common objects, verbatim of verbal expressions, proper names 
and peripheral information, the expectation of the level of detail 
should be lowered. 
 
 That speculative plausibility arguments should not be accepted 
– if plausibility arguments are made, they should be based on 
up-to-date COI. 
 
 That demeanour should not be taken into account when 
assessing the credibility since this cannot be objectively 
assessed. 
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